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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By W.

TARVER ROUNTREE*

The constitutional law cases during the past term reflect the great interest in protecting the rights of the criminal defendant. A majority of the
cases deal with motions to suppress evidence in vindication of the fourth
amendment. This survey will deal with the criminal issues first and then
cover certain additional matters which came to the attention of the courts.
Some reflect significant changes in the law; others are commented upon
because they are apparently quite important to practitioners at present.
I.

RIGHTS OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

A.

Right To Counsel

The supreme court reaffirmed its position in Mercer v. Hopper' that
there is no right to counsel at a probation revocation in Georgia. The court
relied upon Reece v. Pettijohn.' Justice Hall concurred 3 specially, stating
that the rule should not be absolute but should be considered on a case by
case basis, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli.4 Justice Ingram, relying upon his
interpretation of the facts, dissented 5 on the basis of the same case.
The question of whether a pre-trial identification, made where the defendant was displayed without an attorney, tainted an in-court identification,
was dealt with in Yancey v. State.' The court made an independent assessment of facts and, even though no attorney was present during the showup, due process was not offended under the test from Neil v. Biggers.7
State v. Houston' is significant in that it extends the sixth amendment
right to counsel to the preliminary hearing. The court followed the reasoning of Coleman v. Alabama' in deciding that the preliminary hearing,
where allowed, was a critical stage in the prosecution.
In Cunningham v. State,'I the court ruled that counsel's ineptitude in
handling an appeal denied the defendant due process and equal protection
of the laws. This is a very interesting proposition which Justice Undercofler
did not elaborate upon. The defendant was not an indigent, but counsel's
failure in procedural matters had vitiated her appeal.
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. University of Alabama (A.B., 1949);
Harvard Law School (LL.B., 1952).
1. 233 Ga. 620, 212 S.E.2d 799 (1975).
2. 229 Ga. 619, 193 S.E.2d 841 (1972).
3. 233 Ga. at 620, 212 S.E.2d at 800.
4. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
5. 233 Ga. at 620, 212 S.E.2d at 800.
6. 232 Ga. 167, 205 S.E.2d 282 (1974).
7. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
8. 134 Ga.App. 36, 213 S.E.2d 139 (1975).
9. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
10. 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974).
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Right To A Speedy Trial

In Hall v. State,' I the court reaffirmed the test for violation of the sixth
amendment guarantee to a speedy trial. As stated earlier in Barker v.
Wingo," the elements are: "(a) Length of delay, (b) the reason for the
delay, (c) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (d) prejudice to the
defendant." This was interpreted as a balancing test and as applied to this
case resulted in sustaining the defendant's plea in bar. The court emphasized in Sanders v. State,'3 that the burden is upon the defendant to
establish the violation. Justice Ingram dissented in an adverse ruling
against the defendant in Treadwell v. State," on the grounds that no
reason had been shown for the prosecution's delay, a factor which defeats
balancing against prejudice to the defendant.
C.

Right To A Fair Hearing

In Roberts v. Greenway,'5 the petitioner claimed that he had entered
pleas of guilty without an understanding of the possible consequences
evolving from the entry of the pleas. The case provoked court comment on
8 When a
the standards dictated by Boykin v. Alabama."
defendant raises
the question of the validity of his plea of guilty, the burden is on the state
to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. It may do
this by
(1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was
cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences
of his plea; or (2) file a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that
affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.' 7
The court required an affirmative showing of compliance, but overruled
the trial court's contention that the defendant could invoke the attorneyclient privilege to prevent admission of evidence of what the trial attorney
told the defendant. This is established also in Bailey v. Baker" which also
rejects the contention that only the trial judge may advise defendant of the
consequences of his plea.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

131
407
132
233
233
395
233
232

Ga.App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 644 (1974).
U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
Ga.App. 580, 208 S.E.2d 597 (1974).
Ga. 468, 211 S.E.2d 760 (1975).
Ga. 473, 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975).
U.S. 238 (1969).
Ga. at 475, 211 S.E.2d at 766 (citations omitted).
Ga. 84, 205 S.E.2d 278 (1974).
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D.

Motion To Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence

Warrantless Arrest and Seizure
In Hiatt v. State,' Judge Eberhardt reaffirmed the necessity of a written
motion to suppress illegally seized evidence under Ga. Code Ann. §27313(b) (Rev. 1972). When the motion is oral, a denial is authorized.
Under a warrantless search and seizure, the burden of proving that the
2
0
search and seizure was lawful is upon the state." In Merritt v. State, 1
where officers set up a roadblock to apprehend armed robbers, an
indiscriminate stopping and searching of an automobile not under suspicion rendered the evidence seized inadmissible.
In Menegham v. State,22 the court of appeals noted that
"[an automobile in which contraband goods are concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant, provided the police have probable cause for believing that the automobile which they search contains
the contraband. [Citation omitted.] The reasonableness of the
search must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and
is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine.
[Citation omitted.]"
State v. Swift3 posed difficult questions for both the court of appeals
and the supreme court, until the supreme court ultimately sustained an
arrest and seizure which occurred at a roadblock at Jekyll Island. The
court of appeals was disturbed that the purpose of the roadblock was
manifestly illegal, while the supreme court reaffirmed the general view
that where an officer is authorized to make "stops" for law violations, he
may seize what is in plain view. Both cases" should be read for the
varied appraisal of the "legality" of the stops.
Georgia has recognized that less stringent requirements apply to a warrantless search of an automobile than to a permanent dwelling.2 5
After an automobile has been impounded pursuant to a lawful arrest,
2
evidence seized during an inventory is legal. 1
Where an officer is executing a warrant of a suspect, he may search the
area within the immediate presence of the persons arrested and seize any
stolen property as tangible evidence of the commission of a crime.2
In Godwin v. State,' 8 the court held that Miranda warnings are not
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

132 Ga.App. 289, 208 S.E.2d 163 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §27-313(b)(Rev. 1972).
133 Ga.App. 956, 213 S.E.2d 84 (1975).
132 Ga.App. 380, 382, 208 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1974).
232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974).
131 Ga.App. 231, 206 S.E.2d 51, rev'd, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974).
Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga.App. 305, 211 S.E.2d 198 (1974).
Pierce v. State, 134 Ga.App. 14, 213 S.E.2d 162 (1975).
Boyd v. State, 133 Ga.App. 136, 210 S.E.2d 251 (1974).
133 Ga.App. 397, 211 S.E.2d 7 (1974).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

required prior to the search of a person reasonably suspected of shoplifting.
Officers may seize evidence on public property even though the seizure
5
is accompanied by an illegal arrest. In State v. Roberts,"
hitchhikers were
stopped without reasonable cause, but evidence (drugs) which they had
thrown away could be seized. The property was abandoned. The defendant
could not show that there was a search of his person or protected property.
The question of the search pursuant to consent is discussed in Ferguson
v. Caldwel. 3 Here a second search was validated. There seems to be no
absolute rule on how long consent continues, but it should not be used to
justify searches for other crimes.
Patterson v. State31 dealt with the interesting question of whether an
officer could arrest for the commission of a felony which he witnessed by
spying on the defendant with binoculars. The court sustained the arrest
and the seizure of the growing marijuana. The officer was not trespassing
at the time he observed the defendant harvesting the marijuana.
The problem of who is aggrieved by an unreasonable search and seizure
2
was faced in Nealey v. State."
The defendant testified that he had authorization from the owner to use the cabin which was subjected to a warrantless search to his disadvantage. The court found that he was an "aggrieved
person" and that the motion to suppress should have been granted.3
Search and Seizure With a Warrant
The propriety of the search warrant received much attention last term.
Although the following cases may not present significant developments,
they are discussed because of their present importance to the practitioner.
The warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. A
justice of the peace, who was a part-time police radio dispatcher, was not
so qualified according to Baggett v. State.3'
A search warrant must be executed by an officer legally qualified to do
so. In Baxter v. State,3" the court reviewed with great care the authority
of a GBI agent to do so, finally satisfying itself that such authority existed.
The case also reaffirmed the methodology of execution: a knock, an identification, a reasonable lapse for a response before using physical force to
3
enter the premises. 36 The officer need not be uniformed. 1
The affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant came under close
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
and so
34.
35.
36.
37.

133 Ga.App. 206, 210 S.E.2d 387 (1974).
233 Ga. 887, 213 S.E.2d 855 (1975).
133 Ga.App. 742, 212 S.E.2d 858 (1975).
233 Ga. 326, 211 S.E.2d 286 (1974).
The court, however, found the admission of the evidence harmless to defendant's case,
affirmed the conviction. Id. at 328, 211 S.E.2d at 288.
132 Ga.App. 266, 208 S.E.2d 23 (1974).
134 Ga.App. 286, 214 S.E.2d 578 (1975).
Id. at 294, 214 S.E.2d at 583.
Id. at 293, 214 S.E.2d at 583.
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scrutiny in Bailey v. State." Information which may be "stale" will not
support an affidavit. There must be some evidence to show a temporal
relevance. Where the affidavit relies upon tips, it should show when the
informant witnessed the suspicious activity. 9
An unintentional inaccuracy in the information supporting the warrant,
in the totality, will not undermine the warrant.'
Where an officer has a warrant to search for specific items, the seizure
of evidence of other crimes must be supported by probable cause for the
suspicion that the "other" crime has been committed."
Where a warrant authorizes a search of certain premises and "curtilage,"
does this authorize a search of an automobile parked in a driveway on the
premises? In the circumstances of Bellamy v. State, 2 the court said yes.
Accordingly, in McGee v. State, 3 the court said that a hog pen behind a
house was within the curtilage of the building and could not be searched
without a warrant. (Incidentally, the hog pen was a welcome relief from
the sweet aroma of marijuana which permeates so many of these cases.) A
search warrant does not authorize the search of other persons incidentally
on the premises. Such a search must be justified on independent probable
cause.44
There were many cases dealing with the adequacy of the affidavits required to support the issuance of warrants. It would not be profitable to
review all of these. Presumably each case stands on the court's appraisal
of the reasonableness of the probability shown. There must be a basis for
justifying the magistrate's issuance. This is a practical and not an academic test. The court is dealing with the basis for supporting a
"probability." Particularly if the probable cause relies upon an informer,
there must be support for the reliability of the informer."
E.

Self-incrimination

Turning to a civil case for a moment, in Busby v. Citizens Bank of
Hapeville,0 the court reversed a contempt order by holding that only a
witness can determine the incriminatory nature of questions concerning
financial matters. There is nothing for the court to decide and, therefore,
the witness need not offer the basis for the incrimination. Where the questions show as a matter of law that they may be incriminating, only the
witness can weigh the effect. Judge Evans concurred specially stating
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

131 Ga.App. 276, 205 S.E.2d 532 (1974).
Hurd v. State, 131 Ga.App. 354, 206 S.E.2d 112 (1974).
Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 213, 205 S.E.2d 859 (1974).
Zimmerman v. State, 131 Ga.App. 793, 207 S.E.2d 220 (1974).
134 Ga.App. 340, 214 S.E.2d 383 (1975).
133 Ga.App. 184, 210 S.E.2d 355 (1974).
Wallace v. State, 131 Ga.App. 204, 205 S.E.2d 523 (1974).
See Moreland v. State, 132 Ga.App. 420, 208 S.E.2d 193 (1974).
131 Ga.App. 738, 206 S.E.2d 640 (1974).
Id. at 741, 206 S.E.2d at 642.
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that Prince & Paul v. Don Mitchell's WLAQ, Inc." should be overruled
outright. This case had indicated that the court should be satisfied with
the possibility of incrimination without relying upon the witnesses' say so.
The court in the principal case did not go so far.
F. Right To A Fair Tribunal
In Mize v. State,49 the court reversed a trial court's refusal to allow
defense counsel on voir dire to ask:
If there is a conflict in the evidence in what the witnesses who are white
testify, and the witnesses who are black testify, will this in any way affect
your ability to serve in this case fairly, affect your ability to have an open
mind, to be completely impartial?'O
The court held that where, as here, all witnesses for the state were white,
and all defense witnesses were black, it is proper on voir dire to ask questions dealing with racial prejudice of the jurors in order to test their impartiality.
The court sustained Ga. Code Ann. §59-112(d) (Supp. 1974) which permits women to be excluded from jury service merely by notifying the jury
commissioner of the county in which they reside in writing to that effect,
in Maddox v. State.5' The court distinguished Taylor v. Louisiana2 which
struck down an automatic statutory exclusion. The court saw an escape in
the Georgia statute which would prevent a totally male jury. 3 There was
no evidence in the case that the jury list did not represent a cross-section.
In Gould v. State,54 the court reversed the overruling of a challenge to
the array of the grand and petit juries. Ga. Code Ann. §59-106 (Rev. 1965)
requires a fairly representative cross section of the citizens of the county.
Where evidence showed, over a ten year period, under-representation on
race, sex and color, the challenge was sustained. The pattern was set out
in tabular form for Coweta County.55 The court specifically denied any
proportional representation on jury lists.
There is, of course, no Georgia statute or rule of practice which allows
discovery in criminal cases. But due process imposes on the prosecution,
on the defendant's pretrial motion, an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to him in advance of trial. In Hicks v. State,5" the judge
made an in camera inspection to determine whether certain evidence had
to be given to the defendant in order to fulfill the due process requirement.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

127 Ga.App. 502, 194 S.E.2d 269 (1972).
131 Ga.App. 538, 206 S.E.2d 530 (1974).
Id. at 540, 206 S.E.2d at 532.
233 Ga. 874, 213 S.E.2d 654 (1975).
__
U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975).

53.
54.

233 Ga. at 877, 213 S.E.2d at 657.
131 Ga.App. 811, 207 S.E.2d 519 (1974).

55.
56.

Id. at 815, 207 S.E.2d at 523.
232 Ga. 393, 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974).
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The court found that, where the evidence in question was presented at trial
by the prosecution, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show how he has
been prejudiced by not having the evidence earlier.
G.

Double Jeopardy

7
In Cameron v. Caldwell,"
the court declared that under both the U.S.
and Georgia Constitutions, when a jury can not reach a verdict and there
is a mistrial, this does not prevent a re-trial on the same charge.
In Marchman v. State,5" the defendant had had a previous conviction
reversed because "there was a fatal variance between the allegata . . . and
the probata. . . ,,
1 On a second trial, he asserted double jeopardy. The
court construed Ga. Code Ann. §26-507 (Rev. 1972) to permit a distinction
between a situation in which (1) there was a fatal variance, or (2) there
was a finding that even though there was a fatal variance, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. The earlier Marchmanconviction"0
was construed as a fatal variance only in the formal sense; the court did
not hold the evidence inadequate. Under the statute, the defendant could
be tried a second time.

H.

Punishment

In an unusual case the court considered the legality of banishment of the
defendant from seven counties in Georgia as a condition for suspension of
a sentence by a trial court. 1 The state constitution expressly forbids banishment beyond the limits of the state.62 This case thus requires construction of the constitutional limitation. Ga. Code Ann. §27-2711(6) (Rev.
1972) permits the court to require the probationer to "remain within a
specified location." The court of appeals ruled such banishment should be
illegal.6 The supreme court held it to be a matter for the legislature.
Justice Undercofler dissented 4 on public policy grounds that such banishment would permit dumping criminals on other counties.
The Georgia Supreme Court continues to hold that the death penalty
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 5 Nor does it find any
such holding by the U.S. Supreme Court under the eighth amendment.
The court also sustained the Georgia statute against a charge of arbitrariness.
A case which will be mentioned here probably belongs under a discussion
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

232 Ga. 611, 208 S.E.2d 441 (1974).
132 Ga.App. 677, 209 S.E.2d 88 (1974).
Id. at 677, 209 S.E.2d at 89.
Marchman v. State, 129 Ga.App. 22, 198 S.E.2d 425 (1973).
State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 208 S.E.2d 472 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §2-107 (Rev. 1973).
Collett v. State, 131 Ga.App. 411, 206 S.E.2d 70 (1974).
232 Ga. at 671, 208 S.E.2d at 474.
Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d 829 (1975).
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of the "new equal protection." In Calhoun v. Couch,"6 the defendant, upon
a conviction on two counts of burglary, was given probation subject to the
payment of a fine of $250 and restitution to each of his victims. Subsequently the defendant's mother made restitution but the fines were not
paid. On habeas, the defendant claimed a violation of the equal protection
clause. He relied on Williams v. Illinois7 and Tate v. Short." The court
distinguished these cases by stating that the instant case was not a "working off" of a fine. It is difficult to see, however, why the indigent is not
being deprived of his liberty by reason of his indigency, simpliciter. True
there are factual differences, but somehow Justice Ingram does not go
much beyond the factual distinctions.
Conditions of probation were before the court again in M.J W. v. State.",
Here the juvenile was required to contribute "100 hours to Parks and
Recreation Department of DeKalb County."7 In addition to other statutory attack, the defendant argued that the condition imposed involuntary
servitude. The court found such work rehabilitative in light of the statute
and within the punishment exception to involuntary servitude.
L

Right To Bail

Ga. Code Ann. §27-901 (Rev. 1972) provides that specific offenses are
bailable only in the discretion of a superior court judge. In Reed v. State,"
the defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling cocaine and heroin. He
contended that whenever a superior court refuses bail for any offense that
is non-capital it would violate the constitutional right to bail. The court
reaffirmed the judge's discretion, unless it has been manifestly and flagrantly abused.
Parrisv. State72 dealt with the problem of when the Great Writ can issue.
Here the petitioner had in fact already served the sentence of which he
complained. He complained that his conviction was invalid because he did
not have counsel. Having the former conviction set aside was important
in that that conviction enhanced his present sentence under a federal
conviction. Was the petitioner presently "restrained of his liberty" in
terms of Ga. Code Ann. §50-101(c) (Rev. 1974)? Justice Hall held that the
Great Writ was available and that because of the collateral consequences
it was not moot.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974).
399 U.S. 235 (1970).
401 U.S. 395 (1971).
133 Ga.App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974).
Id. at 351, 210 S.E.2d at 844.
134 Ga.App. 47, 213 S.E.2d 155 (1975).
232 Ga. 687, 208 S.E.2d 493 (1974).
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II.
A.

GENERAL DUE PROCESS MATTERS

Necessity For Hearing Before Revocation Or Suspension Of Driver's
License

The court in Pope v. Cokinos, 3 returned to the problem presented to the
Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety by Bell v. Burson. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court held there that Georgia must give a motorist a meaningful
fault or liability hearing before there can be a suspension or revocation. In
the instant case, the Commissioner issued new regulations which allowed
a de novo hearing in superior court, although the license was suspended.
The court rejected this as satisfying the Bell requirements. 5 The court
urged the legislature to provide new legislation to solve this break in administration of the act.
A different twist to the same problem arose in Department of Public
Safety v. Irby"6 in which the court sustained a revocation of the motorist's
license upon certification from Florida after a hearing there on liability.
The court saw this as a problem of reciprocal revocation, and since Florida
had granted a prior hearing, Bell v. Burson" presented no difficulty. Justice Gunter concurred specially"8 on the ground that Georgia had granted
notice and hearing on the Florida certification.
Doran v. Home Mart Building Centers, Inc."9 sustained the attachment
proceeding under Ga. Code Ann. §8-109 (Rev. 1973), where the attachment
affidavit was made before a judge of the superior court; asserted that the
debtor was removing, absconding and concealing himself to avoid paying
the debt; and was made from the personal knowledge of the deponent. The
court thought that the U.S. Supreme Court had not eliminated every
summary proceeding and that if the circumstances created the necessity
for the seizure, and an affidavit were properly made, there could be a
seizure without a hearing. This view emphasized the idea that North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.80 had found the Georgia garnishment
procedure unconstitutional because of the inadequacy of the affidavit requirements.
In Kirton v. Biggers,' the court sustained Ga. Code Ann. §92-6904 (Rev.
1974) by construing it to require notice and hearing before county commissioners could remove a tax assessor "for cause shown." The court gave a
liberal construction to the phrase to save the statute, stating that clearly
removal could only be accomplished after notice and hearing.
73.

232 Ga. 425, 207 S.E.2d 63 (1974).

74. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
75. 232 Ga. at 429, 207 S.E.2d at 66.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

232
402
232
233
419
232

Ga. 384, 207 S.E.2d 23 (1974).
U.S. 535 (1971).
Ga. at 387-88, 207 S.E.2d at 26.
Ga. 705, 213 S.E.2d 825 (1975).
U.S. 601 (1975).
Ga. 223, 206 S.E.2d 33 (1974).
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Roberts v. Macaulay 2 laid to rest Georgia's possessory warrant proceeding."3 In view of the current lively interest in whether any pre-judgment
seizure of property without prior notice and hearing is constitutional, the
statute failed in many respects.

Ill.
A.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS

ProhibitingA Policeman From Publicly Criticizing Superior Officers

In Aycock v. Police Committee of the Board of Aldermen of the City of
Atlanta,84 the court upheld the dismissal of an Atlanta policeman for violating restrictions against public criticism of his superior officers. The
appellant raised first amendment problems but the court responded by
balancing effectiveness and morale against the individual freedom.
B.

Obscenity

Georgia's judicial construction of Ga. Code Ann. §26-2101 (Rev. 1972),
concerning the distribution of obscene materials was found to comply with
Miller standards5 in Dyke v. State.8
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

232 Ga. 660, 208 S.E.2d 478 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN., §82-101 et seq. (Rev. 1970).
133 Ga.App. 883, 212 S.E.2d 456 (1975).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974).

